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Introduction of Competition and
Environmental Regulation in the Electricity
Sector in Hong Kong
Thomas K. CHENG & Jolene LIN*
This article explores both the competition and the environmental aspects of the electricity sector
in Hong Kong, and a possible linkage between them.There has been considerable public pressure
to liberalize the electricity sector in Hong Kong due to longstanding discontent with the
persistently high profit of the sector and a regulatory structure that is widely perceived to be
ineffective. In light of the government’s seeming reluctance to pursue liberalization, this article
examines an alternative approach – litigation under the recently adopted Competition
Ordinance. It assesses the likelihood of success of the strategy and its potential shortfalls. The
article proceeds to analyse whether competition can be used as a tool to improve the
environmental performance of the sector. It concludes that the effect of the introduction of
competition is ambiguous if not adverse and therefore proactive regulatory intervention will be
needed to ensure that environmental performance does not deteriorate following the introduction
of competition. Competition will not be an effective tool to improve the environmental
performance of the sector.
1 INTRODUCTION
Hong Kong’s electricity sector has been under significant public scrutiny in recent
times.The convergence of a number of forces has driven this agenda: First, there
has been growing public dissatisfaction with the current Scheme of Control
regulatory regime.Academics, political parties, and civil society have issued calls for
regulatory reform to introduce competition in order to improve efficiency and
bring down electricity tariffs. Second, air pollution has been a pressing
* Both authors are associate professors at the Faculty of Law of The University of Hong Kong.
Thomas K. Cheng is also a member of the Hong Kong government Energy Advisory Committee,
which is involved in the review of the regulatory regime for the electricity sector, and the
Competition Commission, which is responsible for bringing enforcement action under the new
Competition Ordinance. However, the views expressed in this Article are the personal views of the
author and in no way represent the views of the Energy Advisory Committee or the Competition
Commission. The authors would like to acknowledge the generous support provided by the Public
Policy Research grant given by the HKSAR government, without which this research project
would not have been possible. The authors would also like to acknowledge the able research
assistance provided by Alex Lee, who helped the authors to prepare the grant proposal, and the
research assistance provided by Addiped Cheng, Keith Chan, Stephanie Wong, Tommy Cheung,
Adrian Lo, and Felix Man.
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environmental and health concern in Hong Kong.1 Since mid-2000s, due to
efforts by the media and environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
to educate the public, there is increasing public awareness of the causes and effects
of the serious air pollution problem in the city. Electricity generation constitutes
the largest source of air pollution in Hong Kong, accounting for 92% of total
emissions of sulphur dioxide, and about 50% of nitrogen oxide emissions and
respirable suspended particulates (RSPs). As such, discussions about tackling Hong
Kong’s air pollution problem have had to address the electricity market. Third,
despite reluctance to proactively address climate change because of competitiveness
and ‘first mover disadvantage’ concerns, the Hong Kong government has been
compelled to make some commitments towards reducing the city’s greenhouse gas
emissions.2 Given that electricity generation is a significant source of carbon
dioxide (especially when it involves coal, as is the case in Hong Kong), the issue of
climate change has focused attention on how Hong Kong produces and uses
electricity.
In the public discourse about the future of Hong Kong’s electricity sector,
liberalization has been the buzzword.This is not surprising as market liberalization
has been the dominant trend in energy policy in many parts of the world, notably
in the United States and the European Union, over the past thirty years. However,
it should be noted that most jurisdictions begin with state/public ownership of the
electricity utilities and the opening up of the electricity sector usually involves
privatization and the introduction of regulatory reform to create mechanisms of
ordering the new electricity market.3 In Hong Kong, liberalization takes on a
different meaning as the electricity sector has never been under majority public
ownership. However, a dual monopolistic market structure (there are two regional
monopolies serving different parts of Hong Kong) endures under the Scheme of
Control regulatory framework. It has been argued that liberalization will benefit
1 Hong Kong’s air pollution problem has even received international media coverage. See, for
example, Hong Kong’s poisonous air, The Economist (29 Mar. 2007); Dirty Air Becomes Divisive Issue in
Hong Kong vote, The NewYork Times (22 Mar. 2007).The attempt by the Clean Air Foundation to
judicially challenge the government’s air pollution control policy is an indication of the degree of
public dissatisfaction; see Clean Air Foundation Limited and Gordon David Oldham v. the Government of
the HKSAR, Constitutional and Administrative Law List No. 35 of 2007.
2 Zhao Yuhong, Responding to the Global Challenge of Climate Change – Hong Kong and ‘One Country
Two Systems’, Carbon & Climate L. Rev. 70–81 (2011).
3 There is no standard definition of liberalization (the EC Directive 96/92/EC, for example, does not
define liberalization), but most of the literature defines liberation according to the criteria of
ownership, the diversity of actors competing, market access and the extent of ‘unbundling’ of
generation, transmission, distribution and supply. A liberalized market is characterized by
decentralized ownership, a pool of private actors in the market place, full market access and
unbundling of generation, transmission and distribution; see A.Voss, The Impact of Liberalisation on the
Environmental Performance of the Electricity Sector in Germany, Country Report, Institute of Energy
Economics and the Rational Use of Energy, 2, http://www.dii.uchile.cl/progea/proyectos/
grenelem/first/wp1_germany.pdf (accessed 1 May 2013).
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Hong Kong society: consumers will pay lower electricity tariffs, the incumbent
electricity generation companies and their shareholders will cease to enjoy
monopolistic profits at the expense of taxpayers, and liberalization may even
deliver environmental benefits when electricity generation companies practice fuel
economy and energy saving to minimize production costs. Despite these potential
benefits, the government is perceived to be paying lip service to the liberalization
agenda.
This situation poses some interesting questions. First, if liberalization is a
desirable policy objective that enjoys broad support across society, how the
liberalization agenda can be advanced in the face of governmental inertia is a
pressing question. In this regard, the promulgation of the Competition Ordinance
in June 2012 offers an interesting option. Proponents can attempt to compel the
two incumbent electricity companies to interconnect by bringing a refusal to deal
or an essential facility claim against them. This litigation-based strategy is not
without precedent.The European Commission made use of EU competition law
to open the transport sector in the 1990s.4 Interconnection between the power
grids of the two companies would be a prerequisite for full liberalization of the
Hong Kong energy sector. This would allow the two electricity companies to
compete with each other for customers in their currently monopolized territories.
If independent power providers were to emerge in the market, or if electricity
companies from the China Southern Grid were to enter the Hong Kong market,
which would introduce further competition into the market, these new entrants
would need access to the power grids of the two incumbents, which they could
conceivably obtain under a refusal to deal or essential facility claim against the two
incumbent providers.This article will analyse the prospects of as well as the hurdles
to the successful deployment of this strategy. It will be argued that, for a variety of
reasons, liberalization driven by a suit under the Competition Ordinance is
unlikely to succeed in achieving full liberalization of the electricity sector in Hong
Kong but will go some way towards spurring the government into addressing the
various liberalization-related issues that cannot be resolved by the Competition
Tribunal. The Competition Ordinance is therefore a useful strategic tool for
proponents of liberalization.
Second, just as competition law can serve as a strategic tool for proponents of
market liberalization, can it also serve as a tool to improve the Hong Kong
electricity sector’s environmental performance? The ‘…and environment’ literature
has burgeoned as advocates of environmental protection have sought to create
links or to leverage upon other areas of law such as human rights to achieve
4 Alison Jones & Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 542 (3d ed., Oxford
2008).
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environmental protection goals.5 That environmental laws and policies can give
rise to anticompetitive effects and thereby conflict with competition law is already
the subject of an emerging body of literature. Less studied are the policy and legal
consequences in the opposite direction, that is, the environmental effects of
applying competition law or introducing competition in a market and the
consequent conflict or complementarity between competition law and
environmental law.6 Our review of publicly available resources leads to the
conclusion that there is inconclusive evidence that lower electricity tariffs (possibly
brought about by competition) will lead to increased demand for electricity, which
triggers increased supply/generation of electricity (and higher levels of air
pollution). There is some evidence that competition can lead to environmental
improvements as electricity companies compete to provide energy services
(including options for consumers to purchase renewable energy) rather than
compete purely on price. There is, however, a relatively strong consensus in the
literature that the environmental effects of liberalization in the electricity sector
can be negative and regulatory intervention to address these environmental effects
is essential.This article therefore argues for proactive and vigilant enforcement of
environmental laws in the event of liberalization. Further, if liberalization results in
increased cross-border sale of electricity, this effectively means that the
environmental costs of electricity production are transferred from Hong Kong
across the border.This raises a number of concerns that also need to be addressed.
Section 2 of this article sets out the current regulatory regime for the
electricity sector in Hong Kong and, where it is deemed useful, the historical
background which informs the unique characteristics of the existing regulatory
framework. Section 3 analyses the use of a litigation-based strategy to propel the
process of liberalization.This strategy has become a viable option only because of
the promulgation of the Competition Ordinance in 2012.This article argues that a
litigation-based strategy faces significant hurdles but can play an important role in
advancing the process of liberalization to improve consumer welfare in Hong
Kong in the face of governmental inertia. Section 4 argues that the environmental
effects of liberalization of the electricity sector can be ambiguous and can
exacerbate the territory’s serious air pollution problem.There is a strong consensus
in the literature that the liberalization of the electricity sector ought to be
accompanied by decisive regulatory intervention to address the adverse
5 The formation of such ‘strategic linkages’ has been enabled by widespread recognition that the
protection of the environment is a sine qua non for numerous human rights such as the right to life
and the right to health: see, for example, Judge Weeramantry, separate opinion in Case Concerning
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project [1997] I.C.J. Rep, 7, 91–92; MC Mehta v. Union of India AIR 1988 SC
1037; Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India AIR 1996 SC 2715; MC Mehta v. Kamal Nath
AIR 2000 SC 1997.
6 See discussion in s. 4 below.
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environmental consequences that tend to result. Section 5 concludes that
liberalization of Hong Kong’s electricity sector is a laudable policy objective as
liberalization can increase consumer welfare without compromising environmental
quality in Hong Kong as long as a rigorous and well-designed regulatory
framework is put in place.
2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGULATORY REGIME FOR THE
ELECTRICITY SECTOR
For more than a century, China Light & Power (CLP) and Hong Kong Electric
Company (HEC) have been supplying electricity to Hong Kong.And for the last
two, three decades, they have been the sole suppliers in their respective territories.
HEC supplies electricity to Hong Kong Island, Lamma Island, and Ap Lei Chau,
while CLP covers the rest of the city, including Kowloon, New Territories,
Lantau, and most of the outlying islands. Both companies are fully vertically
integrated electricity suppliers, covering generation, transmission, distribution, and
retail sale of electricity.7 This division of territory is only the result of historical
development. There is, in fact, no government-granted franchise that gives these
two companies exclusivity over the territories they serve.8 There is, legally
speaking, no barrier to either company entering each other’s territory or to a new
entrant entering the Hong Kong electricity market at all. However, for a variety of
reasons, such as the substantial sunk costs required for entry and the lack of land
for power generation facilities, no new entrant has attempted to enter the
electricity market in Hong Kong in recent years.9 The two companies effectively
function as regional monopolies in their respective service areas.10 The Energy
Advisory Committee, a government-convened committee that advises the
government on energy policy, has acknowledged the market power of the two
electricity companies.11 On a citywide basis, CLP supplied electricity to about 2.2
million customers in 2005, while HEC supplied about 550,000 customers.12 This
gives CLP a roughly 80% market share and HEC 20% on a number of customer
7 Legislative Council Panel on Economic Services and Panel on Environmental Affairs, Future
Development of the Electricity Market in Hong Kong Stage I Consultation (Stage I Consultation Paper), 3,
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/panels/es/papers/escb1-829-1e.pdf (accessed 15 Apr.
2013).
8 Ibid. at 5.
9 Ibid.
10 Tyler Wolf, Hong Kong’s Electricity Monopolies: Legislative Council Debates and the Liberal Party Position,
2, http://www.civic-exchange.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/2004-TylerWolf.pdf (accessed
15 Apr. 2013).
11 Energy Advisory Committee, Electricity Market Review: Market Power, 4, http://www.enb.gov.hk/
en/resources_publications/policy_consultation/files/Reference06.pdf (accessed 15 Apr. 2013).
12 Legislative Council Secretariat, Information Note: Electricity Market in Hong Kong, 2, http://www.
legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/sec/library/0506in26e.pdf (accessed 15 Apr. 2013).
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basis. In terms of electricity sold, CLP sold 29,382 GWh, while HEC sold 10,755
GWh in 2005.13 This gives CLP roughly a 75% market share and HEC 25% on an
electricity sold basis.
Hong Kong is probably one of the few jurisdictions in the world where the
electricity companies were never under majority public ownership. HEC was the
first electricity supplier in Hong Kong. It was incorporated in 1889 and began
supplying electricity to Hong Kong Island in December 1890.14 CLP was
incorporated in 1901 with a view to supplying electricity to Canton (now
Guangzhou in China) and Kowloon.15 Its service area was later extended to New
Territories and the outlying islands.
The current regulatory regime for the electricity sector in Hong Kong
consists of the ‘Scheme of Control’ (SOC) agreements, which are bilateral,
long-term contracts between the Hong Kong government and each of the two
electricity companies. There is currently no legislation governing the economic
regulation of the electricity sector.There is, however, legislation pertaining to the
safety and technical aspects of the industry.16 This somewhat unusual
contract-based regulatory system originated in the 1950s and 1960s, when it was
recommended at one point that the government nationalize the two companies.
This brief flirtation with nationalization occurred against the backdrop of massive
public discontent with the performance and tariff levels of the two electricity
companies. In the early 1950s, the two electricity companies introduced a fuel
surcharge on top of the regular tariff to protect themselves from unstable fuel
prices. In 1957, following the Suez Crisis, the surcharge was raised from 9% to
18%.17 This increase caused huge uproar from the local industrialists, which were
heavily reliant on electricity, and led to calls for nationalization.18
Amid this public outcry, then-colonial governor Sir Robert Black set up a
three-person commission, called the Electricity Supply Companies Commission,
to examine the industry and offer suggestions to the government.19 The
Commission eventually recommended that the government take over the two
companies to ‘permanently remove the competing interest between the
shareholders and the public’.20 The government, however, was reluctant to follow
13 Pun-Lee Lam, The Scheme of Control on Electricity Companies 24–25 (The Chinese U. Press 1996).
14 Ibid. at 3.
15 Ibid.
16 The safety and technical aspects of the industry are governed by the Electricity Ordinance, which is
enforced by the Electrical and Mechanical Services Department. Stage I Consultation Paper, supra n. 7,
at 5, 11.
17 Lam, supra n. 13, at 6.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid. at 7.
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the recommendation due to its serious financial implications.21 Eventually, CLP,
together with its new business partner Esso Eastern Inc. (the trade name for the
overseas operations of Exxon), provided a solution to the conundrum by
proposing a SOC for fifteen years, to which the government eventually agreed.22
As envisioned by CLP and Esso, the main purpose of the SOC was ‘to limit the
disposable profits of the companies to a reasonable return on their equity capital
while providing adequate incentives towards efficiency and expansion’.23 Under
the agreement, CLP promised to lower tariffs and set limits on dividends, which
placated the government and the public.24 CLP did make good on its promise and
tariffs were lowered during the first SOC agreement.25 Thus, emerged this
somewhat peculiar regulatory arrangement between the Hong Kong government
and the two electricity companies. The first SOC agreement between CLP and
the Hong Kong government expired and was renewed in 1978. It was then that
HEC entered into its first Scheme of Control agreement with the government.
Calls for reform of the regulatory regime surfaced when the SOC agreements
were up for renewal in 1993 and in 2008. Suggestions have ranged from merger of
the two companies in order to reap the economies of scale from transmission to
full liberalization of the sector.26 The SOC-based regulatory regime has been
criticized throughout the years as favouring the electricity companies rather than
protecting consumer interests. However, on both occasions, the government opted
to extend the SOC arrangement with minor adjustments. There are signs,
however, that things may be about to change upon expiration of the current SOC
agreements. First, the term of the current SOC agreements has been reduced from
fifteen years to ten years, with an option of an extension for another five years.27
The government reduced the duration of the agreements despite opposition from
the electricity companies. Second, the government has required the two electricity
companies to acknowledge that it is free to revamp the current regulatory regime
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid. at 9.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Pun-Lee Lam, Regulatory effects on electricity prices in Hong Kong, 21 Energy Economics 529, 544
(1999).
26 Lam, supra n. 13, at 26–27, 85.
27 The Scheme of Control Agreement entered into by the Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region and the following companies: CLP Power Hong Kong Limited, ExxonMobil
Energy Limited and Castle Peak Power Company Limited (CLP Scheme of Control), at 9; The
Scheme of Control Agreement entered into by the Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region and the following companies: The Hong Kong Electric Company, Limited
and Hong Kong Electric Holdings Limited (HEC Scheme of Control), at 9.
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in 2018.28 Third, the government has made it clear that it will consider liberalizing
the sector in 2018 if the conditions are suitable.29
The current regulatory arrangement has its strengths and weaknesses. It has
been said that ‘[a]lthough such a long-term regulatory contract can protect the
regulated firm’s investment against opportunistic behaviour of the regulator, it may
fail to achieve efficient production decisions and may lower the incentive to
reduce costs’.30 This is attested to by the fact that labour productivity of the two
companies has historically shown little gain.31 Under the SOC arrangement, the
government recognizes that:
the Companies and their shareholders are entitled to earn a return which is reasonable in
relation to the risks involved and the capital invested in and retained in their business, and
in return, the Government has to be assured that service to the consuming public
continues to be adequate to meet demand, to be efficient and of high quality, and is
provided at the lowest cost which is reasonable in the light of financial and other
considerations.32
One of the key components of the SOC agreements is profit control. Under the
previous SOC agreements that lasted from 1993 to 2008, the permitted maximum
rate of return for equity capital was 15% while that for debts was 13.5%.33 This
differential treatment was designed to provide shareholders of the two companies
incentives to invest in the companies. The net return to the shareholders is then
calculated by making two deductions: (1) interest payable on long-term financing
up to a maximum of 8% per annum; and (2) a charge of 8% per annum on the
average balance of the Development Fund (renamed Tariff Stabilization Fund in
the 2008 SOC agreements) to be credited to the rate reduction reserve, which is
used to reduce tariff for consumers.34 The local politicians and the general public
have always been critical of what was perceived to be excessive returns to the
electricity companies, especially when maximum permitted returns are de facto
guaranteed returns, and when the two companies operate in a practically risk-free
environment.35
28 CLP Scheme of Control, at 3; HEC Scheme of Control, at 3; Legislative Council Panel on
Economic Development, New Scheme of Control Agreements With the Two Power Companies (New
Scheme of Control Agreements), 2, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/es/papers/
edevcb1-546-1-e.pdf (accessed 15 Apr. 2013).
29 New Scheme of Control Agreements, supra n. 28, at 2.
30 Pun-Lee Lam, Competition in Energy 36 (City U. Hong Kong Press 1997).
31 Ibid. at 55.
32 The Scheme of Control Agreement entered into by the Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region and the following companies: CLP Power Hong Kong Limited, ExxonMobil
Energy Limited and Castle Peak Power Company Limited, at 3.
33 Legislative Council Secretariat, supra n. 12, at 4.
34 Ibid. at 7.
35 Wolf, supra n. 10, at 7.
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These high permitted rates of return have translated into high tariffs.
According to Lehman Brothers, Hong Kong has the third highest electricity tariffs
in the world.36 Academic opinions, however, diverge on whether these permitted
rates of return were excessive.37 By leveraging their positions and relying on debt
capital, CLP and HEC in fact have achieved a higher rate of return on equity
capital than the permitted rates of return.38 The rates of return on equity capital
have been calculated to be in excess of 20%,39 and exceed the costs of equity
capital.40 The rates of return on equity capital have been found to compare very
favourably with the utilities in other Asian countries.41 Another study found that
the returns achieved by CLP and HEC are typically twice of those achieved by
other utilities considered to be performing well elsewhere in the world, such as
American Electric Power, British Energy, and Tokyo Electric Power.42
When the SOC agreements were renewed in 2008, legislators and the local
community put enormous pressure on the government to negotiate for a lower
rate of return.43 Eventually, the two electricity companies agreed to accept a
9.99% permitted rate of return on average net fixed assets and an 11% permitted
rate of return on average renewable net fixed assets (fixed assets for generating
renewable energy).44 On the date of commencement of the new SOC
agreements, CLP and HEC lowered their tariffs by 10% and 19% respectively.45
Based on 2006 figures, the reduced rates of return were projected to cut the
annual earnings of the two companies by HKD 5 billion.46
36 Ibid. at 8.
37 Chi-Keung Woo, Ira Horowitz & Asher Tishler, A Critical Assessment of the Hong Kong Government’s
Proposed Post-2008 Regulatory Regime for Local Electricity Utilities 34 Energy Policy 1451, 1454–1455
(2006); Stephen Luk, Electricity Tariffs in Hong Kong:What Went Wrong and What Can We Do About
It? 33 Energy Policy 1085, 1088–1089 (2005).
38 Lam, supra n. 13, at 114, 120.
39 Wolf, supra n. 10, at 3.
40 Lam, supra n. 30, at 51.
41 Ibid. at 44.
42 Federation of Hong Kong Industries, Restructuring Hong Kong’s Post-2008 Electricity Market: A Proposal
by the Federation of Hong Kong Industries, 3, http://www.industryhk.org/english/news/news_sp/
files/Electricity_Report.pdf (accessed 15 Apr. 2013).
43 Wolf, supra n. 10, at 9, 15–16; Legislative Council Panel on Economic Services, Future Development of
the Electricity Market in Hong Kong:Views received during the Stage II Public Consultation (Stage II Views
Received), 3, http://www.enb.gov.hk/en/resources_publications/policy_consultation/files/es0529cb
1-1567-1-e.pdf (accessed 15 Apr. 2013).
44 CLP Scheme of Control, at 5–6; HEC Scheme of Control, at 6.
45 Legislative Council, Official Record of Proceedings (Wednesday, 10 Jun. 2009), 8799.
46 New Scheme of Control Agreements, supra n. 288, at 4; Legislative Council Question, LCQ14: Interim
review of the Scheme of Control Agreements, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201210/17/P2012
10170217.htm (accessed 15 Apr. 2013); Legislative Council Panel on Economic Development,Minutes
of special meeting held on Tuesday, 8 January 2008, at 4:30 pm in the Chamber of the Legislative Council
Building (LegCo Minutes), 4, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/es/minutes/ev0801
08.pdf (accessed 15 Apr. 2013).
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The SOC agreements have been often criticized for the fact that because the
rate of return is based on investment in net fixed assets, the two electricity
companies have an incentive to over-invest in fixed assets and capacity to obtain a
higher rate of return.47 Moreover, the rate of return is fixed for the duration of the
contract,48 which is unusual when compared to other jurisdictions that have
adopted rate-of-return regulation, such as some US jurisdictions, where the
permitted rate of return is not fixed.49 There is ample evidence to support the
allegation of over-investment. First, it has been found that CLP and HEC maintain
an excess capacity that is one of the highest in the world, and substantially higher
than comparable jurisdictions.50 From the 1970s to the 1990s, the excess capacity
of the two companies consistently exceeded 40%, while the international norm is
25%.51 Second, it has been observed that the two companies have tended to
announce large capital investment plans after the Schemes of Control have been
renewed.52 Occasionally, there are questions about whether certain investment
projects are justified. For instance, Legislative Council member Ka-ki Kwok
questioned whether CLP’s proposal to construct a Hong Kong Dollar (HKD)10.2
billion LPG receiving terminal was an attempt to inflate its fixed assets.53 This is
not to say that the over-investment has yielded no benefit to Hong Kong. The
electricity system in Hong Kong enjoys 99.99% reliability, which is almost
unparalleled in the world.54 However, it has been said that this high degree of
reliability has been achieved through wasteful spending: ‘It is undoubtedly true
that overinvestment produces higher reliability of supply up to a point, but it does
so with diminishing returns as we squeeze the last decimal points out of
reliability.’55
Under the previous SOC agreements, once a capital investment plan has been
approved by the government, the electricity company is entitled to raise the tariff
to a level necessary to allow it to achieve the permitted rate of return.To justify
their long-term capital investment plans, the two companies have tended to
overestimate the growth in consumer demand for electricity.This overestimation is
all the more unreasonable as the trajectory for electricity demand in Hong Kong
47 Wolf, supra n. 10, at 2; Legislative Council Secretariat, supra n. 12, at 5.
48 Legislative Council Secretariat, supra n. 12, at 5.
49 Lam, supra n. 30, at 69–70.
50 Luk, supra n. 377, at 1086–1088.
51 Lam, supra n. 30, at 55–56.
52 Scheme of Control, supra n. 13, at 74.
53 LegCo Minutes, supra n. 46, at 9.
54 Stage I Consultation Paper, supra n. 7, at 6; China Light & Power, Annual Report 2011 (CLP 2011
Annual Report), 38, https://www.clpgroup.com/ourcompany/aboutus/resourcecorner/investment
resources/Documents/2011/E108.pdf (accessed 15 Apr. 2013).
55 David Webb, Hong Kong’s Electricity Tax, http://webb-site.com/articles/electrictax.asp (accessed 15
Apr. 2013).
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has been stable since the early 1990s.56 In recent years, the growth has been
steadily around 2%.57 In the case of CLP, it has an added incentive to overestimate
demand to justify excess capacity because it can sell the extra electricity generated
to China and retain 20% of the profit. The government has not imposed any
meaningful ex post facto review of capital investment to determine whether it
turned out to be excessive.58 Although the current SOC agreements contain
provisions which stipulate that only 50% of the costs incurred to install capacity
that has been deemed to be excessive will be reimbursed by consumers,59 there is
no evidence that these provisions have been invoked to scrutinize and penalize the
two companies for constructing unnecessary capacity. Furthermore, the
environmental performance of the two electricity companies has been far from
satisfactory. It has been said that CLP’s Castle Peak Power Station was among the
bottom three in the world in terms of carbon dioxide emissions, while HEC’s
emission performance was also below average.60
Given the problems with the SOC agreements and the long-simmering
public dissatisfaction with them, it is small surprise that there have been calls to
discard the SOC agreement and to liberalize the industry altogether. There have
been consistent calls from Legislative Council members and members of the local
community for the government to liberalize the electricity market and to open it
up to competition.61 The electricity companies, unsurprisingly, have expressed
concerns about the benefits of liberalization.62 There were hopes of liberalization
the last time the SOC agreements were renewed in 2008.The government opted
for a cautious course of action and to maintain the status quo. However, as a
compromise, the government made a public commitment to explore the
possibility of liberalizing the industry when the current SOC agreements expire in
2018.The expectation is that if the government were serious about liberalization,
it would have made relevant preparations by the time the agreements were up for
mid-term review in 2013. However, relevant preparation has been conspicuously
absent thus far.The government has been accused of dragging its feet. Given the
time it takes to prepare and implement a full liberalization plan, the belief is that it
is already too late to aim for liberalization in 2018.This has spawned speculation
56 China Light & Power, Annual Report 2009 (CLP 2009 Annual Report), 36, https://www.clpgroup.
com/ourcompany/aboutus/resourcecorner/investmentresources/Documents/2009/CLP_AR_2009_
Eng_Full.pdf (accessed 15 Apr. 2013).
57 Ibid.
58 Lam, supra n. 13, at 74.
59 CLP Scheme of Control, at Sch. 7; HEC Scheme of Control, at Sch. 7.
60 Legislative Council Panel on Economic Development, Background brief on Scheme of Control
Agreements with the power companies (Background Brief), 6, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/
english/panels/edev/papers/edev1126cb1-189-4-e.pdf (accessed 15 Apr. 2013).
61 Ibid.
62 CLP 2009 Annual Report, supra n. 57, at 36.
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that the government is not genuinely interested in pursuing liberalization and
made that commitment in 2008 merely to placate detractors.
With the passage of the Competition Ordinance in Hong Kong on 14 June
2012, proponents of liberalization are presented with an alternative. It is possible to
use the abuse of substantial degree of market power provision in the Ordinance to
compel the two electricity companies to provide each other and other
independent power generators access to their power grid.This would indeed be an
audacious move. In the next Section, we will evaluate whether this is a viable
strategy and the potential problems with such an approach.
3 USING COMPETITION LAW TO INTRODUCE LIBERALIZATION
3.1 A LITIGATION-BASED STRATEGY FOR LIBERALIZATION
If the Hong Kong government were to drag its feet with liberalization of the
electricity sector, as seems to be the case, proponents of liberalization could
conceivably resort to the recently passed Competition Ordinance to propel the
process. In particular, proponents can attempt to compel the two electricity
companies to interconnect by bringing a refusal to deal or an essential facility
claim against them. Interconnection between the power grids of the two
companies would be a prerequisite for full liberalization.This would allow the two
electricity companies to compete with each other for customers in their currently
monopolized territories. If independent power providers were to emerge in the
market, or if electricity companies from the China Southern Grid were to enter
the Hong Kong market, thereby introducing further competition into the market,
these new entrants would need access to the power grids of the two incumbents,
which they could conceivably obtain under a refusal to deal or essential facility
claim against the two incumbent providers.There are, however, many hurdles to a
successful deployment of this strategy.As the analysis below will show, for a variety
of reasons, liberalization driven by a suit under the Competition Ordinance is
unlikely to succeed in achieving full liberalization of the electricity sector in Hong
Kong.
The relevant provision in the newly adopted Competition Ordinance is
section 21, which is also known as the second conduct rule. It is the equivalent of
section 2 of the Sherman Act and Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union. Section 21(1) of the Competition Ordinance states that ‘[a]n
undertaking that has a substantial degree of market power in a market must not
abuse that power by engaging in conduct that has as its object or effect the
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prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in Hong Kong’.63 Section
21(2) proceeds to provide two examples of conduct that would be deemed to be
an abuse under subsection (1), namely predatory behaviour towards competitors,
and (2) ‘limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers’.64 Section 21(3) provides a list of factors to be considered in
determining whether an undertaking wields a substantial degree of market power.
As suggested earlier, to achieve interconnection between the existing power
grids and to allow potential new entrants to gain access to them, it would be
necessary to bring a refusal to deal or essential facilities claim against the two
electricity companies. Section 21(2) does not specify refusal to deal or to supply an
essential facility as abuses of substantial market power. However, in the draft
guidelines on the second conduct rule prepared by the Hong Kong Competition
Commission for public consultation, refusal to deal was included as a potential
abuse.There were also references to refusal to supply an essential input.The draft
guidelines state that “refusal to deal” describes a situation where an undertaking
with a substantial degree of market power refuses to supply an input to another
undertaking, or is willing to supply that input only on objectively unreasonable
terms’.65 The guidelines further state that ‘[a] refusal to deal may harm
competition in the downstream market by preventing the undertaking seeking
access to the relevant input from: (a) operating in that market; or (b) operating in
that market as an effective competitive constraint’ and that ‘[c]oncerns may arise in
particular when the refusal relates to an input that is indispensable for undertakings
operating in the downstream market’.66 Based on the foregoing, it is likely that the
Commission will regard a refusal to deal or to supply an essential facility claim an
abuse under the second conduct rule.
The first hurdle to the success of a litigation-based strategy for liberalization is
that under the Competition Ordinance, there is no stand-alone private right of
action. Only the Commission may initiate proceedings against an infringing party
in the Competition Tribunal. Private parties may lodge complaints to the
Commission regarding potential infringements of the Ordinance under section 37.
However, the Commission is under no obligation to investigate a complaint ‘if it
does not consider it reasonable to do so’.67 This language gives the Commission
considerable latitude to decide whether to initiate legal proceedings. If the
Commission is minded to toe the government line against liberalization (should
63 Competition Ordinance (Cap. 619), § 21.
64 Ibid.
65 Hong Kong Competition Commission, Draft Guideline on The Second Conduct Rule—2014, 30,
http://www.compcomm.hk/en/draft_guidelines_2014.html (accessed 15 Oct. 2014).
66 Ibid.
67 Competition Ordinance (Cap. 619), § 37.
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this be an official government policy), the Commission may refuse to investigate
the complaints lodged by the relevant parties. In that case, the litigation-based
strategy is doomed from the outset. This hopefully will not happen as the
Commission is meant to be an independent enforcement body free from
government influence.
Even if the Commission were to accept the complaints, in order for there to
be a valid refusal to deal or to supply an essential facility claim, there must first be a
request to deal or for supply of essential facility and a refusal to entertain the
request. The transmission networks of CLP and HEC have been interconnected
since the 1980s for the purpose of mutual support in the event of an emergency.68
They are currently connected by a submarine cable with a 720-MVA capacity.69 It
has been argued that a capacity to transfer up to 1000 MW regularly would be
sufficient to allow competition between CLP and HEC.70 Local politicians have
long been in favour of increasing interconnection between the two networks. Fred
Li, a legislator, has argued forcefully that the costs of interconnection would be
much lower than the costs of constructing a new plant.71 Therefore, it is possible
to achieve interconnection between these two power grids by compelling the two
companies to provide access to their respective power grids to each other. This
would allow them to sell to each other’s existing customers, which would
introduce a modicum of competition to the electricity sector. However, there is no
guarantee that the two electricity companies would request access to each other’s
grid. In fact, given their aforementioned reservations about liberalization, one may
argue that it is unlikely that they will request access.Without a request for access,
there would be no refusal to deal or supply an essential facility claim.
Yet it would, in fact, make economic sense for the firm with the lower tariffs,
which currently is CLP, to request access to the other’s grid. CLP currently enjoys
lower costs of production due to its larger scale and sells its electricity at a
considerably lower (30% lower) price than does HEC. If CLP can interconnect
with HEC and sell to HEC’s customers, it could undercut HEC’s prices and take
customers from HEC. And CLP possesses sufficient excess capacity to supply
HEC’s customers. Therefore, it is still possible that CLP may request access to
HEC’s grid, which HEC will most definitely refuse.
Not only may CLP want to interconnect with HEC, potential new entrants
into the electricity market will also need access to the two companies’ power grids
in order to reach the customers. There are two sources of potential market
entrants. One is the electricity companies in Guangdong province. The other is
68 Lam, supra n. 30, at 84.
69 Lam, supra n. 30, at 92.
70 Federation of Hong Kong Industries, supra n. 42, at 3.
71 Wolf, supra n. 10, at 4.
WORLD COMPETITION582
potential new local power providers. Regarding interconnection between Hong
Kong and the Mainland, the transmission network of CLP is interconnected with
the Guangdong power system for transmitting contracted power purchase from
the nuclear power plant at Daya Bay and the Guangzhou Pumped Storage Power
Station in Conghua to CLP, and for selling CLP’s electricity to Guangdong.72 The
interconnection between Hong Kong and the Mainland would be sufficient to
allow cross-border competition as it has a capacity in excess of 30% of total Hong
Kong demand.73 Therefore, it is theoretically possible for the Guangdong
electricity companies to sell to CLP’s customers if they have access to CLP’s power
grid. Once they have gained access to CLP’s power grid, they can further reach
HEC’s customers by requesting access to HEC’s power grid (CLP’s grid lies
between Guangdong and HEC’s grid). As for new local power providers, they
simply need to make sure that their generation facilities are connected with either
incumbent’s power grid. These potential new entrants will have the incentive to
request access, which, when denied, will give rise to a refusal to deal or to supply
an essential facility claim. In fact, because potential new entrants will eventually
request for access to HEC’s grid based on the above reasoning (and there are good
reasons that they will given the higher potential profit to be made in
HEC-serviced area),74 the two incumbents’ reluctance to request for access to
each other’s network is arguably not a significant concern.
Once there is an actual refusal to deal or supply and the Commission has
decided to bring a case in the Tribunal, it will be up to the Tribunal to decide
whether access should be granted. The Commission can formulate its claim as
either a general refusal to deal by a firm with substantial market power claim or a
refusal to supply an essential facility claim.TheTribunal is yet to accept and decide
any case.Therefore, there is no indication of how the Tribunal would rule on such
a claim. However, as is true of many emerging jurisdictions, the Tribunal is likely
to refer to the jurisprudential approaches of the leading jurisdictions. In fact, the
Competition Ordinance is said to be modelled after the EU regime.75 In light of
Hong Kong’s historical lineage with the UK in terms of legal traditions, the
Tribunal is likely to look to UK, and by extension EU, case law for guidance.
Given the importance of US jurisprudence in international competition law, the
72 Stage I Consultation Paper, supra n. 7, at 20.
73 Federation of Hong Kong Industries, supra n. 42, at 3.
74 One may argue that in light of recent experience, it is highly unlikely that there will be potential
local entrants into the market. However, it is likely that potential entrants have been deterred from
entering the market due to the lack of a local grid and the possible need to construct one from
scratch.With the assistance of the Competition Ordinance, this need may be alleviated if not averted
altogether and potential entrants may be more likely to appear as a result.
75 Tanna Chong, Small businesses say competition bill lacks clarity, South China Morning Post (23 May
2012), http://www.scmp.com/article/734008/small-businesses-say-competition-bill-lacks-clarity (acc
essed 24 Apr. 2013).
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Tribunal may consider the US approach as well.What follows is an analysis of how
a refusal to deal and a refusal to supply an essential facility claim brought by the
Commission would be analysed under US and EU law.
Before one can determine whether the refusal to interconnect constitutes an
abuse of dominance under EU law or conduct sufficient for the purpose of
monopolization under US law, one needs to define the relevant market and
establish dominance or monopoly power of the two electricity companies. The
relevant threshold in the Hong Kong law is substantial market power, which is a
lower requirement for market power than either dominance or monopoly
power.76 The relevant product market is clearly that of the supply of electricity. In
that market, CLP and HEC are the only two participants in the market in Hong
Kong.The more difficult question is geographic market definition.There are two
alternatives. One is to define the geographic market as covering the entire Hong
Kong, in which case CLP would have a market share of between 70% and 80%
and HEC between 20% and 30%. Given the extremely high entry barriers to this
market and the lack of countervailing buyer power, CLP’s market share would be
sufficient to constitute dominance under EU law and monopoly power under US
law. Meanwhile, HEC would clearly not be dominant in the overall Hong Kong
electricity market.
The second alternative is to define the relevant geographic markets as the
respective service areas of the two companies: Hong Kong, Ap Lei Chau and
Lamma Island on the one hand and Kowloon, New Territories and the outlying
islands on the other hand. Under this geographic market definition, both
companies would be monopolists in their respective markets. Given the lack of
cross-selling between the two companies’ service areas, the argument for treating
Hong Kong as one integrated geographic market is weak. The market is
partitioned into two isolated service areas; entry into one gives one no access to
the other. Therefore, the better view is that there are in fact two geographic
markets for electricity supply in Hong Kong with two monopolists operating in
their respective service areas. These two companies clearly possess substantial
market power in their respective geographic markets.
As mentioned earlier, the refusal to interconnect, both between CLP and
HEC and between the two of them and any potential new entrants, can be
formulated as a general unilateral refusal to deal claim or an essential facility claim.
The analysis of the two claims shares some similarities but is nonetheless distinct.
Under US antitrust law, the two leading unilateral refusal to deal cases are Aspen
76 Legislative Council Bills Committee on Competition Bill, Responses to outstanding issues from previous
meetings, 1, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/bc/bc12/papers/bc120410cb1-1506-2-e.pdf
(accessed 24 Apr. 2013).
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Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing77 and Verizon Communications v.Trinko.78 In Aspen
Skiing, the US Supreme Court affirmed that even a monopolist has no general
duty to deal with its rivals.79 However, the Court proceeded to clarify that the
right to refuse to deal with other firms is not unqualified,80 and to hold Aspen
Skiing’s refusal to continue to offer the four-mountain pass with Highlands a
violation of the Sherman Act.
The Court based its holding on a number of key facts in the case. First, there
was a pre-existing relationship between Aspen Skiing and Highlands; the two had
been offering the four-mountain pass together for years until Aspen Skiing
terminated it. Second, the unilateral refusal to deal harmed consumers as well as
the plaintiff.There was clear evidence that consumers preferred the four-mountain
pass to the other offerings made by the two companies after the four-mountain
pass was terminated. Third, there was no legitimate business justification for the
refusal. The Court rejected all the reasons given by Aspen Skiing for refusing to
deal with Highlands as pretextual. Lastly, the Court also placed much emphasis on
the fact that Aspen Skiing refused to sell ski tickets to Highlands even at retail
prices, which suggested a desire to sacrifice short-term profit for a long-term
monopoly position.The facts which the Court emphasized are largely consistent
with the draft guidelines produced by the Hong Kong Competition Commission,
in which the Commission states that one of the factors to be considered in a
refusal to deal claim is the past history of dealing between the undertakings.
Professor Herbert Hovenkamp has argued that Aspen Skiing only imposes a
duty to deal on a monopolist if there was a prior course of dealing between the
parties.81 This reading of the case is to some extent supported by Eastman Kodak v.
Image Technical Services, a later US Supreme Court case in which the Court
effectively imposed a duty on Kodak to supply patented and unpatented spare
parts to its rival independent service organizations (ISOs) where Kodak had been
supplying these parts to the ISOs previously, and by Trinko, in which the Court
distinguished Trinko from Aspen Skiing on the grounds of lack of prior dealing
between AT&T and Verizon and declared that ‘the defendant’s prior conduct
sheds no light upon the motivation of its refusal to deal-upon whether its
regulatory lapses were prompted not by competitive zeal but by anticompetitive
malice’.82
77 472 U.S. 585, 105 S. Ct. 2847 (1985).
78 540 U.S. 398, 124 S. Ct. 872 (2004).
79 472 U.S. at 600.
80 472 U.S. at 601.
81 Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice, 299 (3d ed.,
Thomson-West 2005).
82 Trinko, supra n. 79.
INTRODUCTION OF COMPETITION 585
In Trinko, the Supreme Court further narrowed the reach of Aspen Skiing by
observing that the latter case was ‘at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability’.83
In distinguishing Trinko from Aspen Skiing, the Court stressed a number of key
facts: (1) Aspen Skiing sacrificed profit by refusing to sell the ski tickets at retail
prices, while Verizon was being compelled by the Telecommunications Act to sell
the unbundled network elements at highly discounted prices; (2) Aspen Skiing was
already voluntarily selling what Highlands sought to buy from it, whereas ‘[t]he
unbundled elements offered pursuant to § 25(c)(3) exist only deep within the
bowels of Verizon; they are brought out on compulsion of the 1996 Act and
offered not to consumers but to rivals, and at considerable expense and effort’.84
Lastly, the Court noted that compelling Verizon to deal entailed Verizon putting
in place new systems, as opposed to a mere sharing of excess capacity.85
Based on the legal principles summarized above, it would seem that the
Commission cannot establish a valid unilateral refusal to deal claim under US
antitrust law with respect to interconnection between CLP and HEC, and
interconnection between potential new entrants and the two incumbents. First and
foremost, there is no prior dealing between any of these parties in terms of
interconnection of transmission network. If Professor Hovenkamp is correct that
Aspen Skiing can only apply to situations in which there is prior course of dealing,
then there will be no hope for a valid unilateral refusal to deal claim on behalf of
any of the parties. Moreover, what is sought from the two incumbents is not
something that is readily available and sold at retail. Our case is probably more akin
to Trinko, where what the plaintiff sought is a part of the defendant’s network: in
that case, unbundled network elements, in our case, the power grid and
transmission facilities built by the two incumbents.
Regarding the remaining factors from Aspen Skiing, it is probable that the
Commission would be able to demonstrate consumer harm by a refusal to deal.
Interconnection would permit the introduction of competition, which may drive
down electricity tariffs.Thus a refusal to deal may deny Hong Kong consumers the
benefit of lower tariffs.As to legitimate business justifications for refusing to deal, it
is difficult to predict what justifications the two incumbents would offer. One
likely justification is technical difficulty in interconnection. Whether that
justification would be accepted would depend on the Tribunal’s scrutiny of the
technical requirements of interconnection. On balance, it is unlikely that the
Commission’s unilateral refusal to deal claim against the two electricity companies
would prevail under existing US antitrust jurisprudence.
83 540 U.S. at 399.
84 540 U.S. at 411.
85 540 U.S. at 410.
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Aside from a general refusal to deal claim, the Commission may also pursue
an essential facility claim against the two incumbents. The status of the essential
facilities doctrine is shrouded in some mystery after Trinko, in which the Supreme
Court refused either to affirm or repudiate it.86 In fact, the authors of the leading
US antitrust law treatise have stated that ‘the essential facility doctrine is both
harmful and unnecessary and should be abandoned’.87 Since the Supreme Court
refused to repudiate it, the general presumption is that the doctrine continues to
exist in US antitrust law. The most authoritative formulation of the doctrine
comes from MCI v.AT&T, in which the Court of Appeal for the Seventh Circuit
stated that the doctrine has four elements: (1) control of the essential facility by a
monopolist; (2) a competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the
essential facility; (3) the denial of use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the
feasibility of providing the facility.88
The first thing that needs to be established before applying the doctrine is that
the defendant possesses an essential facility.The Seventh Circuit defines an essential
facility as one that a competitor cannot practically or reasonably duplicate.
Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp interpret essentiality as consisting of two
elements: ‘First, the claimed input must be essential to the plaintiff competitor’s
survival in the market. Second, the claimed input must not be available from
another source or be capable of being duplicated by the plaintiff or others.
(emphases in original)’89 The facility at issue must be shown to be ‘not just helpful
but vital to its competitive vitality’.90 They further supplement this understanding
of essentiality with the observation that ‘[e]ssentiality is not proven when actual or
potential rivals other than the plaintiff are able to compete without the claimed
facility, when alternative inputs might serve just as well as the claimed facility, or
when access to the facility is already sufficient to guarantee competition’.91 In
light of these various definitions of essentiality, it is quite obvious that CLP’s and
HEC’s power grids constitute essential facilities. First of all, competitors cannot
practically or reasonably duplicate the grids. That would have been prohibitively
costly. Also, most residents of Hong Kong live in high-rise buildings. To install a
new power grid would entail obtaining permission from the management of each
of these buildings. In some buildings there may be no space to accommodate
another grid network.Therefore, a new entrant into the electricity market would
not be able to duplicate the facility practically or reasonably. Second, without
86 540 U.S. at 411.
87 Philip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their
Application, para. 771c (3d ed.,Wolters Kluwer 2008).
88 MCI Communications, Corp. v.AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–1133 (7th Cir 1983).
89 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra n. 88, at para. 773b.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid. at para. 773b3.
INTRODUCTION OF COMPETITION 587
access to the power grid, potential new entrants would not be able to sell
electricity to customers at all. The facility at issue is indispensable for the
competitor’s survival in the market.The power grid is not available from any other
source. Nor can it be duplicated by the potential new entrants.
CLP and HEC clearly control their own power grids.Thus the first element
under the MCI four-part test is met.Assuming that there is a request for access and
that request is denied, the third element is met as well. As for the last element of
feasibility of supply, this would depend on the technical aspect of interconnection.
The two incumbents would probably claim that the submarine cable connecting
their two systems is insufficient to allow full-scale interconnection between their
systems.Available information suggests that this is probably true. However, it would
still be possible for the two incumbents to provide access to their power grids
subject to the capacity of the submarine cable. Of course the Tribunal could order
the two incumbents to expand the capacity of their submarine connection.
However, as Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp have noted, ‘[n]o case has
suggested that the monopolist must build new capacity to satisfy a would-be
sharer’.92 As for the interconnection between Hong Kong and the Mainland, there
is no capacity constraint and it would be fully feasible for CLP to interconnect
with the power grid of Guangdong province.
Therefore, if the two incumbents do not have a legitimate business
justification for denying access to their power grids, it seems that the Commission
would have a valid essential facility claim against the two incumbents if the
Tribunal were to follow the prevailing US approach. In fact, application of the
doctrine to our case is consistent with some of the admonitions of Professors
Areeda and Hovenkamp regarding the doctrine. First, they have noted that there
are only three situations to which the doctrine should apply, one of which is
‘natural monopoly, where rivals can be accommodated without duplication of a
facility, and duplication itself would be socially wasteful’.93 This aptly describes the
power grids of CLP and HEC. Second, they opined that the case for applying the
doctrine is the strongest when the plaintiff seeks to be a rival of the monopolist.
This again applies to our case. Although the plaintiff in our case is the
Commission, the Commission is effectively bringing the case on behalf of
potential new entrants.Third, they argued that ‘[n]o one should be forced to deal
under the antitrust laws unless doing so is likely substantially to improve
competition in the marketplace’.94 Compelling interconnection would introduce
competition to otherwise fully monopolized markets. Competition is likely to
improve substantially.
92 Ibid. at para. 773e.
93 Ibid. at para. 771c.
94 Ibid. at para. 773a.
WORLD COMPETITION588
Under EU law, refusal to supply (not involving intellectual property) can be
classified into two types of cases: (1) termination of an existing supply relationship,
and (2) refusal to start supplying an input.95 The first category of cases includes
such seminal cases as Commercial Solvents v. Commission96 and United Brands v.
Commission.97 These cases are somewhat analogous to the US general refusal to
deal cases in that they are all premised on a pre-existing course of dealing. Because
of this, these cases are inapt for our case.The relevant category of cases would thus
be the second category. According to the European Commission’s Discussion
Paper, a refusal to start supplying an input would only be abusive if ‘(i) the
behaviour can be properly characterized as a refusal to supply; (ii) the refusing
undertaking is dominant; (iii) the input is indispensable; (iv) the refusal is likely to
have a negative effect on competition; (v) the refusal is not objectively justified’.98
It should be obvious that these criteria closely parallel the essential facility doctrine
in the US
The leading EU case on the application of the essential facility doctrine to a
physical facility is the Oscar Bronner case.99 In paragraph 41 of the judgment in that
case, the then-European Court of Justice lay down four criteria for establishing an
essential facility claim: (1) the refusal would likely eliminate all competition in the
downstream market from the person requesting access; (2) the refusal cannot be
objectively justified; (3) the facility must be indispensable to carrying on that
person’s business; and (4) there is no actual or potential substitute for that facility.
On what constitutes an essential facility, the European Commission has defined it
as ‘a facility or infrastructure without access to which competitors cannot provide
services to their customers’.100 In European Night Services, the then-Court of First
Instance reiterated that for a facility to be considered essential, it must not merely
confer an advantage on the undertaking possessing it; there must be no substitute
for it.
Under the definition of an essential facility adopted by the European
Commission and the Court of First Instance, it is clear that the power grids of the
two electricity companies qualify as essential facilities. Competitors cannot provide
electricity retail services without access to their power grids. And the power grids
do not merely confer a competitive advantage; there are no substitutes for them.
95 European Commission DG Competition, Discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to
exclusionary abuses, 62–66, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf (Dis-
cussion Paper) (accessed 23 Apr. 2013).
96 Cases 6/73 & 7/73 [1974] ECR 223, [1974] 1 CMLR 309.
97 Case 27/76 [1978] ECR 207, [1978] 1 CMLR 429.
98 Discussion Paper, supra n. 96, at 64.
99 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v. Mediaprint [1998] ECR I-7791, [1999] 4 CMLR
112.
100 Sealink/B&I Holyhead: Interim Measures [1992] 5 CMLR 255.
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Applying the four criteria from Oscar Bronner, whether the Hong Kong
Competition Commission will have a valid essential facility claim will depend on
whether CLP and HEC can offer an objective justification for denial of access. As
suggested earlier, CLP and HEC may argue technical infeasibility as a reason for
refusing to provide access.Whether that is genuine will need to be determined by
the Tribunal.The other three criteria should be met. First, refusal to interconnect
by CLP and HEC would eliminate all competition in the downstream electricity
retail market from the potential new entrants. Second, access to the power grids is
indispensable to the potential new entrants’ business, without which they cannot
sell electricity to customers in Hong Kong.Third, as mentioned earlier, there is no
actual or potential substitute for CLP’s and HEC’s power grids.
The analysis is largely similar under the five-part test laid down by the
European Commission in the Discussion Paper.Assuming that there is a refusal to
supply essential facility, we have established that the two electricity companies are
dominant (or possess substantial market power) and that the power grids are
indispensable to potential competitors. Denial of access to the power grids clearly
has a negative impact on competition as it precludes all competition in the
downstream electricity retail market. The only remaining question, again, is
whether the refusal is objectively justified. Assuming that there is no legitimate
objective justification for the refusal, the Hong Kong Competition Commission
would have a valid essential facility claim under EU competition law.
3.2 DEFICIENCIES OF A LITIGATION-BASED STRATEGY
Despite the likelihood of success of a litigation-based strategy for liberalization,
such a strategy is unlikely to succeed in introducing full-scale competition to the
electricity sector in Hong Kong.There are a number of limitations to the strategy.
First, regarding the interconnection between CLP’s and HEC’s power grids,
which would introduce competition between the two incumbents in their
respective service areas, the likely beneficiaries, based on the current tariff
structure, will be limited to the existing HEC customers. HEC currently is subject
to higher costs of production and hence charges tariffs that are 30% higher than
those of CLP.101 Allowing CLP to sell to HEC’s customers would put pressure on
HEC to lower tariffs to CLP’s level. However, allowing HEC to compete in CLP’s
territory will exert no competitive pressure on CLP, as HEC is the higher-cost
producer. Therefore, for the majority of electricity customers in Hong Kong,
compelling interconnection between the two companies’ transmission networks
will result in few competitive benefits.
101 Legislative Council Question, supra n. 46.
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Moreover, the government has to be watchful that the two electricity
companies will use the introduction of competition as an excuse to demand
greater fixed asset investments, which in turn justifies higher tariff. The two
companies’ generation capacity was determined based on the needs of customers
in their respective service areas.With interconnection, either company could be
potentially required to service the entire city’s electricity needs, which would
obviously necessitate greater generation capacity. Thankfully, both companies
currently operate with considerable excess capacity. As mentioned in the last
Section, their excess capacities exceed the international norm substantially.
Therefore, the need for new investments is likely to be low. In fact, it has been
argued that once the two transmission networks are fully interconnected and the
two electricity companies can cross-sell into each other’s territories, they would no
longer need to build such large excess capacities for their own service areas.The
need for new generation facilities would be reduced, which lowers the need for
fixed asset investment, which in turn would lead to lower tariffs.102 In any case,
given that HEC currently only services about one-quarter the number of
customers as CLP, it would be unrealistic to expect HEC to expand its capacity
sufficiently to service all of CLP’s customers. When scrutinizing the two
companies’ investment plans, the government will need to take a holistic approach
taking into account Hong Kong’s overall electricity demand. Capacity can no
longer be planned on the basis of individual service areas.
Another limitation of interconnection between CLP and HEC is that the
current submarine cable connecting their two systems was built for emergency
support only and is not intended to permit full-scale interconnection between
them. The government commissioned a technical study in 2003, which
recommended the construction of ‘a new interconnector of two 400 kV circuits,
each of 700 MW in capacity, connecting CLP’s 400 kV system with HEC’s 275
kV system through a new transformer station to be built on Hong Kong Island’ to
allow full interconnection between the two systems.103 As mentioned earlier, even
under the most aggressive use of the essential facility doctrine, no courts in the US
or the EU have ordered the defendant to construct new facilities to accommodate
its rival.104 Therefore, the benefits of interconnection will be constrained by the
capacity of the existing submarine cable.The amount of cross-selling between the
two systems will be limited. Of course, it is possible that, if the economics so
justify, CLP may construct another submarine cable on its own initiative and
demand interconnection with HEC’s power grid. In that case, HEC would have a
difficult time resisting interconnection under the essential facility doctrine. But
102 Wolf, supra n. 10, at 4.
103 Stage I Consultation Paper, supra n. 7, at 21.
104 RichardWhish, Competition Law 697 (6th ed., Oxford 2009).
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until that happens, the full competitive benefits of interconnection will not be
achieved.
Lastly, full liberalization would require more than mere competition between
the two incumbents. It would require the entry of new power providers, of which
there are two sources, locally and the Mainland. In order for new local
independent power providers to enter the market, the first hurdle to overcome is
the lack of land to construct new power generation facilities. There is a chronic
shortage of land in Hong Kong, where land prices are very high.The government
will probably need to provide some preferential land grant to facilitate entry.
Moreover, the existence of considerable excess capacity by the two incumbents
may also be a serious threat to potential new entrants.With considerable excess
capacity, the two incumbents could flood the market with electricity to undercut
the tariffs of the new entrants to make entry uneconomical. The Competition
Commission will need to be vigilant against potentially anticompetitive practices
by the two incumbents against new entrants.
As for new entrants from the Mainland, the short-term outlook is not
optimistic. Guangdong still suffers from electricity shortage and is unlikely to be
able to supply Hong Kong in the near future.105 The supply situation in
Guangdong is still tight.106 The government concluded, based on contacts with
Guangdong authorities and its own study, that ‘it would be prudent at this stage
not to predicate the future development, at least in the short term, of the
electricity market in Hong Kong on supply from the Mainland’.107 The demand
and supply situation in Guangdong is expected to improve in coming years.
Nevertheless, ‘supply would remain tight in the near term, especially in certain
regions and during certain times of the year’.108 Moreover, there are concerns
about the reliability and environmental performance of the Mainland electricity
companies. The government noted that most respondents to the Second
Consultation on the Future Development of the Electricity Market prior to the
renewal of the Schemes of Control in 2008 ‘did not support increased
interconnection, out of concern that it might affect reliability and increase
tariffs’.109 The environmental impact of reliance on supply from China has also
been cited as a reason for reservations about greater interconnection between
105 Federation of Hong Kong Industries, supra n. 42, at 8.
106 Stage I Consultation Paper, supra n. 7, at 26.
107 Legislative Council Panel on Economic Services, Future Development of the Electricity Market in Hong
Kong (Stage II Consultation) (Stage II Consultation Paper), 2, http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/
english/news_events/legco/files/PanelPaper_060327_Annex_e.pdf (accessed 29 Aug. 2014).
108 Hong Kong SAR Government Economic Development and Labour Bureau, Consultation Paper on
Future Development of the Electricity Market in Hong Kong (Stage II Consultation), 5, http://www.
epd.gov.hk/epd/english/news_events/legco/files/PanelPaper_060327_Annex_e.pdf (accessed 29 Aug.
2014).
109 Stage II Views Received, supra n. 43, at 4.
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Hong Kong and China.110 Even though the interconnection between CLP’s
power grid and the power grid of Guangdong province is sufficient to allow
Mainland providers to supply the electricity needs of Hong Kong customers, if the
generation capacity of the Guangdong providers is insufficient to generate excess
supply for the Hong Kong market, these providers are unlikely to provide much
competition to CLP and HEC. However, this does not mean that interconnection
between CLP’s grid and the grid of the Guangdong province is not worth
pursuing. Over time, the supply situation in the Guangdong province will improve
and entry of Guangdong providers into the Hong Kong market will be possible.
A litigation-based strategy is unlikely to achieve full liberalization of the
electricity sector in Hong Kong.There are issues, such as the limited capacity of
the submarine cable connecting CLP’s and HEC’s networks, and the lack of
affordable land for the construction of new generation facilities, that cannot be
resolved through litigation under competition law and would require the
government to formulate a comprehensive policy. However, this does not mean
that the strategy is not worth pursuing. It is possible that once interconnection
between CLP’s and HEC’s networks has been ordered by the Tribunal, the
government will be spurred into action to tackle the various other issues that
cannot be resolved by the Tribunal.The recently adopted Competition Ordinance
remains a useful tool for proponents of liberalization.
4 THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF INTRODUCING
COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR
Having examined how competition law has the potential to be a strategic tool for
proponents of market liberalization, this section explores the environmental effects
of liberalization with the aim of determining whether competition can also be
strategically harnessed to meet environmental objectives.111
This possibility has not been well explored in the literature because it has
largely been the case that the implementation of new environmental laws and
policies has had anticompetitive effects and thereby engaged competition law. In
the European Union (EU), for example, command and control regulation has
given way to the use of market-based mechanisms such as emissions trading and
110 Ibid. at 7.
111 This line of enquiry is inspired by the concept of ‘regime borrowing’ in the international relations
literature. Regime borrowing occurs when linkages are sought to obtain the institutional and
procedural benefits of an existing regime. Examples of such benefits include enforcement or sanction
mechanisms and institutional authority: David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 Am. J. Intl. L. 5–27, at 14
(2002).
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biodiversity banking.112 As Kingston argues, ‘[t]he shift towards market-based
instruments has important implications for the interface between EU
environmental and competition policy, bringing large areas of environmental
policy within the scope of competition law for the first time’.113 This article seeks
to fill a gap in the literature by exploring the effects in the opposite direction, that
is, whether the introduction of competition law can bring about positive or
negative effects thereby engaging environmental law in complementarity or
conflict.
This section begins with a succinct overview of the Hong Kong electricity
market’s environmental performance. This is followed by a review of the various
ways in which competition in the electricity sector can lead to poorer air quality.
Based on publicly available documented case studies and secondary literature, there
appears to be a relatively strong consensus in the literature that the environmental
effects of liberalization in the electricity sector are likely to be negative.This article
therefore argues for proactive regulatory intervention to address these
environmental effects in the event of liberalization. At the same time, if
liberalization results in increased cross-border sale of electricity from the Mainland
to Hong Kong, this effectively means that the environmental costs of electricity
production are transferred across the border to China. This bears a number of
policy ramifications that will be briefly considered in the final part of this section.
4.1 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE OF THE ELECTRICITY MARKET
As mentioned in the Introduction, air pollution is a serious environmental and
public health issue in Hong Kong. In the past few years, Hong Kong has managed
to reduce the emission of conventional air pollutants except sulphur dioxide,
largely due to increased use of coal in electricity generation.114 In order to further
reduce air pollution, the government has sought to ratchet up the pollution
standards applicable to the electricity sector.115
Measures to encourage the power companies to reduce their emissions
include linking the rate of return to their environmental performance and
112 See generally, J. Scott (ed.), Environmental Protection: European Law and Governance (Oxford U. Press
2009).
113 S. Kingston, Greening EU Competition Law and Policy, 41 (Cambridge U. Press 2012).
114 Environmental Protection Department to the Legislative Council Panel on Environmental Affairs,
Progress of Measures to Improve Air Quality (File Ref: CB(1) 647.07-08(15)); Anthony J. Hedley et al.,
Air Pollution: Costs and Paths to a Solution in Hong Kong – Understanding the Connections Among
Visibility, Air Pollution and Health Costs in Pursuit of Accountability, 71 J. Toxicology & Environmental
Health 544 (2008) (explaining the detrimental effects of sulphur dioxide pollution on human life
and natural ecosystems).
115 See discussion in Chi Tak Chan, What are the Alternatives Available to Hong Kong in Structuring the
Electricity Supply Industry? 34 Energy Policy 2891–2904, at 2893 (2005).
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providing financial incentives for investment in renewable energy technologies.
Targets to reduce emissions of certain air pollutants have also been included in the
Specified Process Licenses granted to the power plants under the Air Pollution
Control Ordinance, and these targets have gradually been made more stringent in
order to achieve air quality objectives.116 However, it should be noted that these
regulatory measures do not address the perverse incentives that are engendered by
the SOC regulatory regime. For instance, under the SOC agreements, the two
electricity companies can pass on all their fuel costs to consumers (thereby not
bearing any risks of fuel price fluctuations) but at the same time, they are not
supposed to make a profit from fuel costs. It can be argued that this feature of the
SOC agreements gives CLP and HEC no incentives to economize on fuel, seek
out more efficient fuel alternatives, as well as build more fuel-efficient power
generators. To the extent that liberalization of the energy sector will force the
electricity companies to become more competitive and cost-conscious, companies
are likely to seek cost savings by becoming more fuel-efficient. This may yield
environmental benefits as the burning of fossil fuels to generate electricity is a key
contributor to global warming. Furthermore, the combustion of fossil fuels releases
conventional air pollutants such as microscopic air pollutants that cause long-term
adverse health effects in the population.117
4.2 MARKET LIBERALIZATION: WILL IT WORSEN AIR POLLUTION IN HONG KONG?
This section explores the various ways in which competition in the electricity
sector can lead to poorer air quality. Even though the current body of literature is
small and more empirical work is needed, it can be concluded that the
environmental effects of liberalization of the electricity sector are ambiguous and
liberalization has the potential to exacerbate the territory’s serious air pollution
problem.
4.2[a] Increased Electricity Consumption Due to Lower Tariffs
In theory, the introduction of competition is meant to increase efficiency and
reduce electricity prices, thereby improving consumer welfare. However, the
evolution of prices during and shortly after the liberalization process is complex
and difficult to assess against the background of social, institutional, and
116 Legislative Council Panel on Environmental Affairs Subcommittee on Improving Air Quality, Update
of Air Quality Objectives, Environmental Protection Department, http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/
english/news_events/legco/files/EA_Panel_120416a_eng.pdf (accessed 20 May 2013).
117 For data and useful discussion, see World Health Organization ‘Air Pollution’: http://www.
who.int/topics/air_pollution/en/ (accessed 1 Jan. 2014).
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technological changes. Case studies show that both price increases and price
decreases have occurred in fully liberalized markets.118
From an environmental perspective, upward and downward movements in
price as well as price fluctuations bear implications. A rise in electricity prices is
expected to lead to reduced demand and encourage consumers to conserve or use
more energy-efficient products. Conversely, the effect of a fall in electricity prices
is expected to lead to increased demand and encourage wastage. The
environmental issue at stake here is that electricity generation produces a number
of air pollutants such as sulphur dioxide which pose harm to human beings and
the environment. It is also now widely recognized that energy-related carbon
dioxide emissions are a significant cause of global warming. Thus, that
liberalization may give rise to increased demand for electricity is a cause of
concern for some environmentalists.119
Yet, demand is rather price inelastic, especially in the short term, and research
on the price elasticity of demand of the household sector and the
commercial/industrial sector will have to be conducted to answer the empirical
question of whether reduced prices will lead to substantially increased
consumption in a liberalized Hong Kong electricity market. Eyre has argued that,
in the UK where the government’s energy model estimates that the household
sector long-run price elasticity is only -0.19, ‘household energy market
liberalization may have only a small effect on demand even if price reductions are
quite substantial’.120 He further points out that ‘…it should also be recognised that
increased demand is not synonymous with decreased energy efficiency. Much of
any rise in demand in the UK would be in poorer households, using falling prices
to raise comfort standards with little change in the efficiency with which energy is
used’.121 It has also been argued that although high energy prices may help to
reduce consumption, it is questionable if this is a desirable outcome if the high
energy prices are the outcome of inefficiencies on the production side.122 There is
much merit to Oosterhuis’ policy recommendation that the ‘environmental
benefit’ of high tariffs should not be an argument for maintaining protected
118 E. Bonneville & A. Rialhe, Impact of Liberalization of the Electricity Market on Energy Efficiency, Quality
of Supply and Environmental Performance, Leonardo Energy Discussion Paper, 13 (2005),
leonardo-energy.org (accessed 23 May 2013);W. Lise.V.G.M. Linderhof & O.J. Kuik, Liberalising the
Dutch Electricity Market: Are there Environmental Impacts?, Research Symposium on European
Electricity Markets, The Hague, 1–2 (September 2003), http://www.ecn.nl/fileadmin/ecn/units/
bs/Symp_Electricity-markets/a1_1-paper.pdf (accessed 23 May 2013).
119 A.Y.H. Lo, Merging Electricity and Environment Politics of Hong Kong: Identifying the Barriers from the
Ways that Sustainability is Defined 36 Energy Policy 1521–1537, 1533 (2008).
120 Nick Eyre, A Golden Age or a False Dawn? Energy Efficiency in UK Competitive Energy Markets, 26
Energy Policy 963–972, 964.
121 Ibid.
122 F. Oosterhuis, Liberalization and Environmental Policy in the European Electricity Market, 6 Energy Stud.
Rev. 226–236, 234 (1994).
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electricity markets; instead, the need for higher energy prices call for linking
market liberalization and the introduction of a tax on greenhouse gas emissions.123
Price fluctuations pose a different set of concerns, an issue that has often been
neglected in the literature. Van Soest and de Groot have found that market
liberalization not only leads to lower energy prices, but increased price volatility
which induces firms to be more prudent in their investment decisions concerning
energy-saving and pollution control technologies.
4.2[b] Decreased Investment in Pollution Control Technologies
Increased competition and risk drive players in the electricity market to strive to
reduce costs. Voss documents that in the German experience, one of the first
moves made by German electricity utilities to increase their competiveness in the
newly liberalized market was to introduce drastic cost-cutting measures.124 As
pollution control equipment and monitoring programmes that are already in place
represent sunk costs and the utilities have to continue to comply with
environmental regulations, there is little that electricity utilities can do to reduce
costs on this front other than not operating the pollution control equipment.
However, the point remains that, utilities are minded to reduce expenditure in
pollution control to minimize costs. In the context of Hong Kong, the
environmental regulators will have to be vigilant about policing compliance with
the Specified Processes Licenses issued pursuant to the Air Pollution Control
Ordinance.
4.2[c] Switching to Cheaper Fuel
One of the cost-saving measures that generation companies can undertake is to
use cheaper fuel to produce electricity.There is evidence that liberalization in the
Australian electricity sector led to increased air pollution because companies were
increasing their use of brown coal and low-quality black coal, which is a cheaper
but more polluting source of energy.125
123 Ibid., also see Andrew Ford, Global Climate Change and the Electric Power Industry, in Competitive
Electricity Markets: Design, Implementation, Performance (Fereidoon P. Sioshansi ed., Elsevier 2008) for
discussion of the significant role that the power sector can play in mitigating climate change in
response to either a carbon tax or emissions trading.
124 See A. Voss, The Impact of Liberalisation on the Environmental Performance of the Electricity Sector in
Germany, Country Report, 12, Institute of Energy Economics and the Rational Use of Energy,
http://www.dii.uchile.cl/progea/proyectos/grenelem/first/wp1_germany.pdf (accessed 1 May 2013).
125 D. Sharma & A. Sproule, The Nexus Between Competitive Electricity Markets: A Case Study in Australia,
Special Issue Energy J. 17–39 (1997).
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In the case of Hong Kong, this sort of fuel-switching driven by cost
considerations should not be a major concern because of the government’s
commitment to a specific fuel mix in the future as a major component of its
overall strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We can assume that the
government will seek to translate this policy commitment into enforceable
obligations.126 The government’s ‘Climate Change Strategy and Action Agenda’
identified that in 2009, coal accounted for about 54% of the fuel mix for power
generation, followed by natural gas (about 23%), and nuclear power imported from
Mainland China (about 23%).127 The government plans to achieve the following
fuel mix in 2020: coal (no more than 10%), natural gas (about 40%), renewable
energy (3%–4%) and nuclear (about 50%).128 The increase in imported nuclear
energy will, of course, depend heavily on the rate of construction of nuclear
capacity in Mainland China.
The preceding discussion shows that the environmental consequences of the
introduction of competition in the electricity market are ambiguous at best, and
are adverse at worst.This suggests a negative answer to the question posed at the
outset: can market liberalization be included in the environmental policy toolkit to
improve Hong Kong’s air quality? Further, it can be argued, given that the
environmental effects of liberalization range from being uncertain to being
negative, the environmental regulator in Hong Kong ought to anticipate these
challenges so that market liberalization does not reverse the environmental gains
that more stringent air pollution regulation has achieved or cause further
degradation of Hong Kong’s air quality.
As mentioned before, it is not likely that liberalization will lead to the entry of
new players that will construct new power plants because the costs of obtaining
land are prohibitive unless subsidies and tax exemptions are provided. A more
likely result of liberalization will be opening the market to Mainland power
companies to sell electricity to Hong Kong.This has two potential consequences:
first, competition will lead to lower electricity tariffs and second, Hong Kong can
continue to increase electricity consumption without bearing the environmental
burden of the electricity production process which occurs across the border.That a
wealthy and developed city can continue to enjoy its high standard of living and
126 In the case of the agreement between the Guangdong provincial government and the Hong Kong
government to reduce certain air pollutants by specified amounts, though it is not legally binding
(de jure), the Hong Kong government has implemented concerted action to achieve the goals of the
agreement as if the agreement were a legally binding one; see n. 23 in Jolene Lin, Creating a Market
for Clean Air:The Air Pollution Control (Amendment) Ordinance 2008, 39(2) Hong Kong L. J. 269–284
(2009).
127 Environment Bureau, HKSAR Government, Hong Kong’s Climate Change Strategy and Action Agenda,
43, http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/english/climate_change/files/Climate_Change_Booklet_E.pdf (ac-
cessed 26 May 2013).
128 Ibid.
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pursuit of economic growth while transferring environmental externalities to its
relatively less well-off neighbour gives rise to concerns about the inequitable
distribution of environmental hazards. Yet, even if Hong Kong wishes to be
environmentally responsible in its procurement and consumption of electricity
imported from the Mainland, there is little that the regulatory authorities can do.
Applying Hong Kong laws extra-territorially is not a politically feasible option.
Options such as introducing ‘green electricity’ procurement requirements and
renewable energy certificates are viable only if there is sufficient political will to
increase the share of renewable energy in the city’s fuel mix.
One approach towards reducing the adverse environmental justice impact of
importing more electricity from the Mainland would be to direct governmental
attention and resources towards developing an emissions trading scheme for the
Pearl River Delta (PRD) region.Tentative steps were taken in this direction with
the passage of the Air Pollution Control (Amendment) Ordinance 2008. This
ordinance established an emissions trading scheme (ETS) to facilitate pollution
reduction by HEC and CLP.129 Given that dual monopolistic market conditions
are not suitable for emissions trading, it is not surprising that the ETS has been a
dormant regulatory initiative.130 However, the legal framework for an ETS exists
and it was intended to be a step towards creating a PRD-wide scheme that could
eventually link up with other emissions trading schemes that are being developed
across Mainland China. It is not far-fetched to argue that, in the long term,
developing the regional ETS (which will inevitably involve harmonization of
standards) will create a regulatory pathway to addressing the environmental
concerns of the sale and purchase of electricity between Hong Kong and
Mainland China.
5 CONCLUSION
This article has considered the potential for using competition law to compel the
liberalization of the electricity sector in Hong Kong. It began by evaluating the
current regulatory framework based on the SOC agreements between the power
companies and the government and identifying the shortcomings of this
regulatory approach. While building on the existing literature on Hong Kong
energy policy that focuses on analysing the feasibility of various options for
regulatory reform, this article advanced the novel argument that a lawsuit based on
129 Order No. 31 of 2008.The Bill was introduced on 6 Feb. 2008 (Legislative Council official website,
available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/english/index.htm, accessed 11 Jun. 2008). See Part IVB of the
Air Pollution Control Ordinance (Cap 311).
130 Elsewhere, one of the authors has expressed reservations about the regulatory merit of creating an
ETS that effectively involves only two market actors. Further, CLP owns and operates three of the
power plants in the city while HEC operates one: Lin, supra n. 126.
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the newly promulgated Competition Ordinance can be a strategy for moving the
regulatory reform agenda forward in the face of governmental inertia.
The article then considered the possibility that introduction of competition
will improve environmental performance of Hong Kong’s electricity sector. Our
findings suggest that competition is likely to lead to adverse environmental
consequences. Hence, this article argued for proactive regulatory intervention to
ensure that air pollution does not worsen due to liberalization.The challenge for
Hong Kong is to reform its electricity market regulatory regime to dispel societal
dissatisfaction with high electricity tariffs and to improve air quality. Competition
law can go some way towards addressing the former, but not the latter.
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